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Abstract. Artiﬁcial intelligence changes everything, and almost no jobs
will be immune. The application of AI to the practice of law is well-known
and well-understood. In this paper, we present some aspects of the re-
lated disciplines of forensic science and speciﬁcally the development and
analysis of “pattern [and impression] evidence.” We show that pattern
evidence has a great need for AI. We discuss several applications in detail
but focus mostly on the application of AI-based text analysis technology
to forensic linguistics.
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1 Introduction
Artiﬁcial intelligence (AI), and speciﬁcally the joint data science and machine
learning revolutions, are fundamentally changing the way that the world works.
Where the industrial revolution radically changed the nature of blue-collar jobs
by handling much of the physical labor, AI promises to radically change white-
collar jobs by handling much of the routine intellectual labor. For example, search
engines perform much of the job of reference librarians or research assistants;
speech-to-text systems handle the work of stenographers, and machine learning
systems can do routine tasks such as interpret radiology images.
The practice of law has been greatly altered as well [1]. Document review in
civil litigation can be an expensive and time-consuming task involving manual
inspection of hundreds of thousands of documents. “Technology Assisted Re-
view” systems [31] use text classiﬁcation to “learn” what the characteristics of
relevant documents are, and perform with better than human-level accuracy in
a small fraction of the time and cost [16]. Patent search technology similarly
makes it very easy to ﬁnd prior work related to a new or disputed invention.
Contract analysis (determining, for example that a proposed contract doesn’t
contain a choice of law provision) is more accurate, more eﬃcient, and cheaper
if done by a computer. Ainsworth [1] identiﬁed several other areas where AI is
likely to have a major eﬀect in the near future.
In this paper we focus on not just the routine practice of law, but on a related
area, that of developing scientiﬁc (“forensic”) evidence. We argue that forensic
science is an important and underserved area ripe for the application of artiﬁcial
intelligence, one that is capable of producing great beneﬁts to society at large.
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2 Forensic Science
An important interdisciplinary subﬁeld within the law is that of forensic science,
which can be loosely deﬁned as the application of science for the purposes of a
court of law. As the American Academy of Forensic Sciences puts it:
The forensic sciences are used around the world to resolve civil dis-
putes, to justly enforce criminal laws and government regulations, and
to protect public health. Forensic scientists may be involved anytime an
objective, scientiﬁc analysis is needed to ﬁnd the truth and to seek jus-
tice in a legal proceeding. Early on, forensic science became identiﬁed
with law enforcement and the prosecution of criminal cases—an image
enhanced by books, television, and movies. This is misleading because
forensic science is objective, unbiased, and applies equally to either side
of any criminal, civil, or other legal matter.1
With the rise of television shows such as CSI or NCIS, the use of forensic sci-
ence as a tool in criminal investigation is well-understood by the general public,
but the actual use of forensic science is much broader. For example, forensic
genealogists [20] are rarely involved directly in criminal cases, but may be used
to locate heirs for probate, help ﬁnd missing heirs, assist adoptees with ﬁnding
their birth parents, or even help DNA experts locate relatives of a person of
interest for genetic studies. Forensic chemists may determine the composition of
a material to see if a product is safe to sell. Forensic engineers can reconstruct
accidents to aid investigators in determining events, their causes, and damages.
As will be discussed later, even linguistics has its forensic applications. Forensic
linguists have been asked to investigate documents relevant to criminal cases [7,
15], but have also contributed to the resolution of commercial disputes [35] or
even helped to resolve questions of identity in immigration hearings. [26]
As with other types of “expert” evidence, the use of forensic science is gov-
erned by the local rules of law. In the United States,2 the admission of expert
evidence in Federal courts is governed by the Federal Rules of Evidence as inter-
preted through three famous cases.3 FRE 702 lays down four criteria that must
be met before an expert may testify. In broad terms, these criteria are simply that
the testimony must be helpful, reliable, and factually well-grounded. Daubert, in
turn, provides (explicitly Popperian [44]) guidelines for judges to assess whether
or not these criteria are met. Canadian law4 of course does not rely on US law,
but has explicitly adopted similar criteria. The joint legal system of England
1 AAFS, https://www.aafs.org/home-page/students/choosing-a-career/what-is-
forensic-science/, accessed 29 April, 2019.
2 The author bases most but not all of his practice in the US.
3 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); General Electric
Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997); Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137
(1999) — collectively often called the Daubert trilogy
4 R. v. Mohan, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 9; R. v. J. (J.-L.), [1999] 130 C.C.C. (3d) 541 (Que.
C.A.)
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and Wales [54] has developed a four-requirement system (“assistance,” “relevant
expertise,” “impartiality,” and “evidentiary reliability”) with a similar eﬀect.
Many jurisdictions that do not provide explicit reliability requirements (e.g.,
Scotland [34]) are regarded as problematic and the American Daubert standard
has been explicitly cited as a model to follow.
In theory, these rules should ensure that the evidence that reaches the judge
and the jury is well-founded and reliable. Indeed, under Daubert, decision-makers
should even know the “known or potential rate of error” as measured through
testing. A particular treatment of evidence that has been shown under a variety
of controlled conditions — “supported by appropriate validation,” in the words
of Daubert — to yield a correct answer in a high percentage of cases can and
should be given more credence than a simple “we’ve always done it this way.”
Even the evidence used by police in investigating a crime should meet these
standards, as otherwise the police would risk having a case dismissed for lack of
reliable evidence.
Unfortunately, this is not always, or perhaps even commonly, the case. A
well-known counterexample is that of Brandon Mayﬁeld [42], who “had been
identiﬁed [. . . ] as the source of a (partial) ﬁngerprint found on a bag of detona-
tors” connected to a terrorist attack in Madrid, Spain. No fewer than three sep-
arate FBI experts independently conﬁrmed that Mayﬁeld had made the (single)
ﬁngerprint. At the same time, however, the Spanish National Police laboratory
had found that Mayﬁeld was not the source of these prints. A court-appointed
and supposedly independent expert agreed with the FBI. The mere fact of this
discrepancy, if made public, should have suggested that the FBI’s determination
was neither reliable nor factually well-grounded. Nor, given the risk of proceeding
against an innocent man, was it in any way helpful.
Later investigation [42] suggested several causes of this erroneous ﬁnding. The
FBI suggested technical explanations: “the poor quality of the digital image of
LFP 175, lack of access to the original ﬁngerprint on the bag of detonators, and
the similarity of LFP 17 to Mayﬁeld’s ﬁngerprint.” Later investigators were not
so kind: “Several panelists concluded that the initial examiner failed to conduct
a complete analysis of LFP 17 before conducting the IAFIS search, which in turn
caused him to disregard important diﬀerences in appearance between LFP 17
and Mayﬁeld’s known prints. Several panelists cited overconﬁdence in the power
of IAFIS and the pressure of working on a high-proﬁle case as contributing to the
error. Some panelists stated that the veriﬁcation was ‘tainted’ by knowledge of
the initial examiner’s conclusion.” Formal analysis by the Oﬃce of the Inspector
General concurred: “we concluded that the examiners committed errors in the
examination procedure, and that the misidentiﬁcation could have been prevented
through a more rigorous application of several principles of latent ﬁngerprint
identiﬁcation.” In other words, this misidentiﬁcation was caused primarily by
human error.
5 the FBI’s copy of the partial print in question
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3 Pattern Evidence
Fingerprint identiﬁcation is one type of what forensic scientists term “pattern
[and impression] evidence,” deﬁned by the United States National Institute for
Science and Technology as:
any markings produced when one object comes into contact with an-
other object, such as ﬁngerprints, shoeprints, toolmarks, and tire treads.
It also includes pattern analysis, such as is used when evaluating hand-
writing, typewriting, and writing instruments 6.
Fingerprints are perhaps the best-known example of pattern evidence, but other
application areas include ballistics markings, toolmarks, bite marks, bloodstains,
shoe prints, and questioned documents. Even the study of biometrics, such as
facial recognition, can be a form of pattern evidence. Central to this ﬁeld are
the assumptions that, ﬁrst, (as Ainsworth and Juola [2] put it) “a creator’s
characteristics are reﬂected in his or her creation, such that patterns displayed
in the creation can provide evidence regarding the identity of it’s maker.” For
example, the pattern of ridges on a ﬁngertip are assumed to be reﬂected in the
pattern of lines in a ﬁngerprint it creates. Similarly, the properties of a typewriter
should be reﬂected in documents typed on it, the properties of shoes and tires
should be reﬂected in their prints, and the properties of teeth should be reﬂected
in their bitemarks.
The second assumption is that the process of forensic analysis can iden-
tify these properties with suﬃcient accuracy, consistency, and reliability to be
“helpful, reliable, and factually well-grounded” as described above. Unlike the
previous assumption, this is an empirical and technical issue, as it reﬂects the
analysts’ ability to identify and measure aspects of the pattern and to connect
the dots to a speciﬁc individual.
Unfortunately, critical analysis of these assumptions has in many cases been
lacking. [40, 49] For many forensic sciences, especially long-standing practices
such as latent ﬁngerprint analysis, the validity of the method has simply been
assumed and accepted as such by courts. Recent scandals “have called increasing
attention to the question of the validity and reliability of some important forms
of forensic evidence and of testimony based upon them” [49]. In particular, some
studies that have been done have shown [49]:
– “a 2002 FBI re-examination of microscopic hair comparisons the agency’s
scientists had performed in criminal cases, in which DNA testing revealed
that 11 percent of hair samples found to match microscopically actually came
from diﬀerent individuals;
– “a 2004 National Research Council report, commissioned by the FBI, on
bullet-lead evidence, which found that there was insuﬃcient research and
data to support drawing a deﬁnitive connection between two bullets based
on compositional similarity of the lead they contain;
6 NIST, Pattern and Impression Evidence, https://www.nist.gov/oles/pattern-and-
impression-evidence, accessed 29 April 2019
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– “a 2005 report of an international committee established by the FBI to re-
view the use of latent ﬁngerprint evidence in the case of a terrorist bombing
in Spain, in which the committee found that ‘conﬁrmation bias’—the in-
clination to conﬁrm a suspicion based on other grounds—contributed to a
misidentiﬁcation and improper detention; and
– “studies reported in 2009 and 2010 on bitemark evidence, which found that
current procedures for comparing bitemarks are unable to reliably exclude
or include a suspect as a potential biter.”
and further that “ FBI examiners had provided scientiﬁcally invalid testimony
in more than 95 percent of cases where [microscopic hair analysis] was used to
inculpate a defendant at trial.”
A major further issue is that “expert witnesses have often overstated the
probative value of their evidence, going far beyond what the relevant science can
justify. Examiners have sometimes testiﬁed, for example, that their conclusions
are ‘100 percent certain;’ or have ‘zero,’ ‘essentially zero,’ or ‘negligible,’ error
rate. As many reviews—including the highly regarded 2009 National Research
Council study—have noted, however, such statements are not scientiﬁcally de-
fensible: all laboratory tests and feature-comparison analyses have non-zero error
rates” [49]. For example, a ﬁngerprint expert testiﬁed in U.S. v. Baines (2009)
that the FBI had an error rate of fewer than one instance in ten million cases
7 In light of these issues, it is clear that the current state-of-the-art in forensic
science is problematic in a way that artiﬁcial intelligence may be able to address.
The typical structure of a problem in pattern evidence can be understood
as a data classiﬁcation problem. In a typical case (without the use of computer
assistance), the analyst will look at one or several “known” samples as well
as the “unknown” or “questioned” samples of interest—these samples might
be documents, ﬁngerprints, ballistic markings on a bullet, and so forth. From
these samples, the analyst will identify features of interest in the samples. In
ﬁngerprint analysis, a typical feature (termed “minutia”) might be the ending of
a ﬁngerprint ridge, a spot where a ridge bifurcates, a “dot” (a ridge of relatively
small dimension), a “delta,” a scar on a ﬁngertip, and many others, including
the inevitable “miscellaneous” category. [32, 56] Associated with these minutia
are their locations. The analyst has tremendous discretion about which features
to select, and will usually [32, 56] focus on a relatively small (8–12) number
of features for a given comparison; for example, [6] marks ﬁngerprint cases for
review but will still accept the results unless at least twelve features are used
in the analysis. The analyst will then determine which, if any, of these features
are shared among samples. If a suﬃciently large number of features are shared
and a suﬃciently small number of features are not shared (again, “suﬃcient” is
often left to the discretion of the analyst), the result is declared to match.
The techniques of forensic DNA analysis, which PCAST has declared “excel-
lent examples of objective methods whose foundational validity has been prop-
erly established,” follows this structure as well, with some improvements. The
7 U.S. v. Baines 573 F.3d 979 (2009) at 984, cited in [49].
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feature set studied comprises 13 speciﬁc genetic loci that can be isolated and
identiﬁed; two samples match if and only if the alleles at these loci are the same.
The random match probability (the likelihood of a false positive error) can be
calculated based on empirical demographic measurements and the mathematics
of population genetics. Key to this precision is the fact that the features used
are standardized and deﬁned in advance, the fact that the measurements them-
selves can be taken with high precision, and the fact that the match criteria are
well-understood and objective. DNA is often considered the “gold standard” of
forensic science in part for these reasons.
By contrast, bitemark analysis is almost purely subjective and highly inaccu-
rate. [48] While it is possible to measure parameters of human teeth, standards of
practice (as with ﬁngerprints) do not specify which features should be analyzed.
Furthermore, skin distortion makes it impractical if not impossible to reliably
analyze a bitemark, even to determine if a speciﬁc injury is a mark produced by
human teeth. As a result, PCAST “ﬁnds that bitemark analysis is far from meet-
ing the scientiﬁc standards for foundational validity” and, damningly, “considers
the prospects of developing bitemark analysis into a scientiﬁcally valid method
to be low. We advise against devoting signiﬁcant resources to such eﬀorts.”
4 Case studies: Forensic Linguistics and Authorship
Analysis
Forensic linguistics [14, 9, 43, 36] is a ﬁeld not reported on by PCAST, but it
shows many of the traits of other pattern evidence. Due to its historical connec-
tion both with statistical analysis [39] and with computational linguistics [22,
51, 30, 45], though, it is also a good example of how artiﬁcial intelligence can be
deployed to improve evidence. A typical evidentiary task [7, 15] is to analyze a
questioned document to determine its authorship by inspection of the writing
style. For example, a document that speaks of parking a “lorry” on the “pave-
ment” in front of an “ironmonger” (instead of a “truck” on the “sidewalk” in
front of a “hardware store”) is likely to have been written by a speaker of Com-
monwealth English, as opposed to US English. A more realistic example [50, 17]
derives from a kidnapping case, where the ransom note said to put the money in
a trash can “on the devil strip” at a particular corner. The examining linguist
noted that “devil strip” is a highly regionalized term—used only near Akron,
Ohio, USA—and correctly suggested that the police should look for connections
with the Akron area.
In general, language is a highly underconstrained system in that there are
many ways to express the same thought. Linguist Malcolm Coulthard writes
that a person’s personal writing style “will manifest itself in distinctive and
cumulatively unique rule-governed choices for encoding meaning linguistically
in written and spoken communications they produce.” [8] Thus, the creation (a
document) will reﬂect the choices of the creator, and at least in theory, these
choices can be detected and compared as features to other choices/features in
other documents. While some of these choices require highly expert domain
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knowledge (as with the “devil strip” example), others can be expressed in fairly
straightforward mathematical and algorithmic terms. For example, statisticians
since the 19th century have suggested that average word length [38, 37] would
be a useful way to detect authorship, on the assumption that some people tend
to use bigger words than others. In a now-classic study, Mosteller and Wallace
[39] used Bayesian statistics on a carefully chosen set of short, common words to
attribute the authorship of the Federalist papers. The use of such “stop words”
or “function words” has proven to be a widely used [55, 5, 4, 19, 12], robust, and
informative feature set that enables accurate authorship determination. Other
successful features include the use of character or word n-grams [52] among more
than 1000 diﬀerent feature sets that have been proposed [47].
One key insight that AI has brought to forensic linguistics [2] is that by
formalizing analysis procedures and instantiating them in computer algorithms,
evaluation of proposed methods is easier, more accurate, and more comprehen-
sive [57, 23]. For instance, the use of average word length (in conjunction with
statistical methods like t-tests) is not regarded as particularly accurate [18]. As
one author [25] put it:
If you actually get a group of documents together and compare how
diﬀerent they are in average word length, you quickly learn two things.
First, most people are average in word length, just as most people are
average in height. Very few people actually write using loads of very
long words, and few write with very small words, either. Second, you
learn that average word length isnt necessarily stable for a given author.
Writing a letter to your cousin will have a diﬀerent vocabulary than a
professional article to be published in Nature.
However, a simple tweak can greatly improve accuracy; instead of averaging
word lengths, one treats word length as a probability distribution (for example,
pi% of the words in the sample are i letters long) and samples can be compared
for similarity using any number of distance metrics (e.g., Euclidean distance,
Kolmogorov-Smirnoﬀ distance, etc.) By treating length as a probability distri-
bution instead of a single average, more information is available to the analyst8
which can be shown empirically to improve performance.
As a tutorial example, it is diﬃcult to improve on Binongo’s [4] attribution
of the 15th book of Oz. The long-running series that started with The Wonderful
Wizard of Oz changed authors after L. Frank Baum’s death, but the authorship
of The Royal Book of Oz remained in dispute. Was it, as publishers initially
claimed, based on a mostly complete draft left by Baum, or was it largely the
work of the author hired to continue the series?
To address this, Binongo extracted the ﬁfty most frequent words from the
various books of the Oz series as well as other works by the same authors,
and calculated the token frequencies of these words. These ﬁfty words include
words like ” He then applied principal component analysis (PCA) to reduce this
8 As any poker player can tell you, a three and a nine are not the same as a pair of
sixes, despite having the same average.
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ﬁfty-dimensional space to an easily plottable two dimensions. The resulting plot
showed clearly that the ﬁrst principal component separated the two candidate
authors; without exception, all samples by Baum had positive values along this
axis, while all samples by the other author had negative values. Upon further
showing that all samples from the Royal Book also had negative values, the
conclusion is fairly clear that Baum did not write even a substantial fraction of
that work. As Binongo expressed it, the “stylistic gulf” between the candidates
“conﬁrms . . . [that f]rom a statistical standpoint, this book is much more likely
to have been written by Thompson than by Baum.”
Another high-proﬁle example is Juola’s analysis [27, 25] of the pseudony-
mously published detective novel The Cuckoo’s Calling. Using a collection of
other detective novels, including J.K. Rowling’s The Casual Vacancy, Juola per-
formed four separate analyses based on four separate feature sets: (1) word
length, (2) character 4-grams, (3) word pairs, and (4) the 100 most frequently
used words (as per Binongo’s analysis above). As Juola wrote, “Of the four au-
thors, Rowling, and only Rowling, was not eliminated by at least one analysis.”
The accuracy of this analysis was conﬁrmed when Rowling herself acknowledged
authorship after this analysis was made public—a rare example of an actual
dispute where the ground truth could be conﬁrmed after the fact.
Although there are many ways of addressing this type of question, there
are some typical similarities. A typical authorship attribution experiment might
run as follows. After selecting a questioned document of interest and collecting
sample documents from each of the candidate authors under consideration, one
performs the following steps:
– pre-process the documents to convert them into canonical form (canonicize);
– extract features or events from each document. For example, Binongo iden-
tiﬁed ﬁfty common words as features, while Juola identiﬁed the lengths of
individual words as one of his feature sets;
– apply a classiﬁcation technique to determine which candidate author wrote
the questioned document. Binongo used PCA; Juola used nearest neighbor
with a speciﬁc distance formula. More sophisticated analysis can determine
probabilities and conﬁdence measures, or possibly decide that none of the
above wrote it.
This is a typical instantiation of a traditional AI problem, that of text classi-
ﬁcation. In this regard, it is little diﬀerent than language identiﬁcation or part-
of-speech tagging (where a single instance of a word must be identiﬁed with its
grammatical category based on the features present in the immediate context).
5 Discussion
What does AI bring to forensic science? As mentioned above, AI technology can
improve evaluation and testing of forensic methods. While it is not necessary for
forensic science to be perfect (and unreasonable to expect it to be), it is certainly
desirable for it to be as accurate as practical, and it is arguably necessary for the
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inaccuracy to be recognized and measured so that the judge and jury can evaluate
an expert’s ﬁndings appropriately. For this reason, the “known or potential rate
of error” associated with a given analysis is one of the Daubert factors that aﬀect
whether an expert’s ﬁndings will ever see the inside of a courtroom.
While forensic scientists have long recommended proﬁciency testing as a
method of quality control, the recent controversies have demonstrated this to be
insuﬃcient. In broad terms, proﬁciency testing (certiﬁcation of one practitioner’s
methods by another practitioner) at best only ensures agreement, but not accu-
racy. As PCAST put it, “neither experience, nor judgment, nor good professional
practices (such as certiﬁcation programs and accreditation programs, standard-
ized protocols, proﬁciency testing, and codes of ethics) can substitute for actual
evidence of foundational validity and reliability.[...] [A]n experts expression of
conﬁdence based on personal professional experience or expressions of consen-
sus among practitioners about the accuracy of their ﬁeld is no substitute for
error rates estimated from relevant studies” [49]. By contrast, AI researchers,
including computational forensic linguists, have a long history of evaluating,
testing, and publishing the accuracy rates of their systems. The TREC series
of competitive evaluations has been extended to a number of similar “bakeoﬀs”
focused on authorship analysis, including the long-running series of workshops
sponsored by the Plagiarism Action Network [21, 24, 29, 53]. As an illustrative ex-
ample, PAN-2013 [29] included texts in three languages, with multiple problems
in each language. The computer was asked to determine whether all documents
in a problem had the same author. Overall performance was well above base-
line, with eight of eighteen participating teams achieving 70% or better on the
English Language problems, and combining all eighteen methods into a single
ensemble method scored 86.7% correct. No comparable results are available for
human analysts; in fact, it may not be practical to do similar testing due to the
amount of time a purely paper-and-pencil analysis by a human takes.
AI also provides signiﬁcant advantages in time and eﬃciency. Binongo’s com-
puter analyzed 14 Oz books by Baum, 14 by Thompson, plus the disputed 15th
book. It also analyzed six non-Oz books by Baum, a non-Oz work by Thomp-
son, and an Oz book by a third, unrelated author. Juola’s analysis, performed
within a day, analyzed ﬁve novels. Forensic laboratories are well-known to be
understaﬀed, underfunded, and overworked—it is impractical for a human to do
this much close reading in a timely fashion.
More generally, PCAST has clearly expressed itself on the need for forensic
science “to be repeatable, reproducible, and accurate, at levels that have been
measured and are appropriate to the intended application.” In addition to help-
ing with the accuracy issue, AI systems are much more likely to be repeatable
and reproducible. By contrast, humans are subject to many well-known factors
such as “conﬁrmation bias” (allowing judgment to be inﬂuenced by other factors
than the data analyzed). This was conﬁrmed in ﬁngerprint studies [11, 10], where
scientists were asked to re-analyze the data from old cases, but with diﬀerent
case information supplied. For example, the scientists might be told that the
prints were from the Mayﬁeld case, and that the FBI had erroneously identiﬁed
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the given prints as a match. In reality, the prints were from previous examples of
the scientist’s own casework, and had been certiﬁed as a match by the scientists
themselves. The majority unknowingly changed their opinion, certifying these
cases to be a mismatch. In other words, believing something diﬀerent about the
circumstances surrounding the ﬁngerprints aﬀected their conclusions about the
ﬁngerprints themselves. By contrast, Binongo’s computer (and Juola’s) does not
know anything about the circumstances, but only about the feature sets fed into
it.
More importantly, though, is the formality that artiﬁcial intelligence can
bring to the process of forensic analysis. For example, to create a feature set
suitable for processing by a computer, it is necessary to deﬁne exactly what fea-
tures are being studied. In forensic linguistics, almost any word or phrase can
potentially be a feature (“devil strip”?) and more than a thousand feature sets
have been proposed in the literature [47]. Large-scale testing enables researchers
to determine the most accurate feature sets and thereby recommend best prac-
tices. Similarly, there are many ways of assessing similarity [41] and testing can
determine the degree to which, for example, support vector machines are more
accurate than simple nearest neighbor algorithms. For DNA comparison, as dis-
cussed above, scientists have already established a standard set of loci and com-
parison methods, but research is ongoing and it is not unreasonable to believe
that ﬁfteen years from now, there will be a new recommended and standardized
set.
By contrast, “There is not currently any method of deﬁning a ‘correct’ [ﬁnger-
print] markup for any given latent. An examiner’s decision of whether a minutia
is present in an unclear location is analogous to an examiner’s decision as to
whether the similarity of two prints is suﬃcient to make an individualization
determination: in either case, the best information we have to evaluate the ap-
propriateness of examiners decisions is the collective judgment of other experts”
[56]. The lack of standardization can have signiﬁcant eﬀects:
“[I]n the vast majority (>90 percent) of identiﬁcation decisions, ex-
aminers modiﬁed the features marked in the latent ﬁngerprint in re-
sponse to an apparently matching known ﬁngerprint (more often adding
than subtracting features). (The sole false positive in [one] study was
an extreme case in which the conclusion was based almost entirely on
subsequent marking of minutiae that had not been initially found and
deletion of features that had been initially marked.)” [49]
Indeed, part of the motivation for the cited research is to help develop such
standardized methods; the development, widespread use, and acceptance of AI-
based ﬁngerprint comparison methods would help push this along.
Bitemark evidence is in a suﬃcient state as to be perhaps beyond repair,
but similar issues hold for other pattern-based methods. PCAST, for example,
has this recommendation about ﬁrearms analysis, the study of whether or not
a given gun ﬁred a given bullet based on “toolmarks” left by the gun: “‘to con-
vert ﬁrearms analysis from a subjective method to an objective method. This
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would involve developing and testing image-analysis algorithms for comparing
the similarity of tool marks on bullets.” One possibility, discussed by NIST, is
the creation of a 3D image of a bullet, extracting a “signature” automatically
from that image, then using that image as a feature set for automatic compar-
ison. NIST writes something similar: “While validation studies of ﬁrearms and
toolmark analysis schemes have been conducted, most have been relatively small
data sets. If a large study were well designed and has suﬃcient participation,
it is our anticipation that similar lessons could be learned for the ﬁrearms and
toolmark discipline 9. “We are unaware of any study that assesses the overall
ﬁrearm and toolmark disciplines ability to correctly/consistently categorize evi-
dence by class characteristics, identify subclass marks, and eliminate items using
individual characteristics” 10. Footwear has been singled out by NIST as requir-
ing further research both in terms of feature sets (“[aspects of] the evidence”)
as well as comparison methods (“aspects of the exam process”)11.
Perhaps the most important aspect of the proposed application, though, is
the improvement of the application of justice through wider availability. As men-
tioned above, forensic laboratories are perennially understaﬀed and overworked;
AI-based tools can improve the speed of analysis without loss of accuracy or
reliability. They can also be made available in areas where local conditions and
funding preclude the easy availability of forensic laboratories, but not the need
of access to justice.
Furthermore, the use and testing of AI systems is likely to improve the de-
mocratization of forensic science for technical reasons as well. Systemic bias can
be problematic both for human decision-makers and for computational ones. As
a simple example, humans have an easier time recognizing faces of people of
their own race than of other races [3] 12. Perhaps surprisingly, this is true for
computerized facial recognition software as well; facial recognition performance
is generally better on Caucasians [13, 33]. Since the software itself, of course, has
no race, this is largely a joint property of the features used to perform the classi-
ﬁcation and of the classiﬁcation algorithm itself. If the research on choosing and
comparing features or algorithms itself relies on biased data, then the resulting
9 Forensic Science International, Vol. 208, (2011): 5965. 159OSAC Research
Needs Assessment Form. “Study to Assess The Accuracy and Reliabil-
ity of Firearm and Toolmark.” Issued October 2015 (Approved January
2016). Available at: www.nist.gov/forensics/osac/upload/FATM-Research-Needs-
Assessment Blackbox.pdf.
10 Research Needs Assessment Form. “Assessment of Examiners’ Toolmark Cate-
gorization Accuracy.” Issued October 2015 (Approved January 2016). Available
at: www.nist.gov/forensics/osac/upload/FATM-Research-Needs- Assessment Class-
and-individual-marks.pdf
11 Research Needs Assessment Form. “Examiner Reliability Study:
Black/White Box Study on Footwear and Tire Examiners.”
www.nist.gov/forensics/osac/upload/SAC-Phy-Footwear-Tire-Sub-R-D-001-
Examiner-Reliability-Study Revision Feb 2016.pdf
12 Wikipedia suggests (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross-race eﬀect) that there is a
same-gender and same-age bias as well.
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system is likely to perform worse on test cases outside of its core competency.
This eﬀect—that categorization systems tend not to generalize to novel data sets
as well as we would like—is generally well-known.
However, this is likely to apply to forensic science as well. There are, for
example, well-known genetic markers associated with particular populations;
for example, blood type A is most common in Central and Eastern Europe,
found in roughly half the population, and almost nonexistent among indigenous
populations of Central and South America. This implies that blood type could be
a useful feature in DNA analysis to identify individuals, but would not be useful
among indigenous tribes in the Andes. In fact, using blood type as a feature
would eﬀectively make such tribal populations artiﬁcially homogenous, while
ignoring other (unknown) features that might serve to distinguish this particular
subgroup. Similarly, research has shown that there are eﬀects of race and sex on
ﬁngerprints and other associated biometrics [58, 46]. Either a computer program
or a human analyst will select features that have proven to be useful in their
past experience, which is probably not representative either of the world as a
whole or of a particular subsection far, far away.
Here again, though, artiﬁcial intelligence may have the advantage. It is easier
to retrain a computer system than a person, and it is therefore practical for a
small research group to develop a suitable data set to look at the features of a
particular population of interest in order to better serve that particular popula-
tion. Again, forensic linguistics provides a case study; while (as expected) most
authorship analyses focus on major languages with millions of speakers, Juola
[28] showed that it was practical to perform forensic authorship analysis in the
Arapaho language (a North American indigenous language) using an existing
corpus of language and oﬀ-the-shelf open-source software. Similar projects could
be undertaken in Quechua, Guarani, Mapudpngan, and other indigenous lan-
guages in Argentina and elsewhere, again enhancing access to justice that would
otherwise be denied to them due to an absence of appropriately-trained human
forensic scientists.
6 Conclusions
The quest for justice is one of the most important social problems. To make
the right decision, it is important, perhaps even critical, to have the right in-
formation. In this paper, we have presented some examples of how courts can
decide which information is “right” (that is, helpful, reliable, and factually well-
grounded) and discussed some real-world problems with the information typi-
cally oﬀered to courts. We contend that the application of artiﬁcial intelligence
in forensic science can improve quality and access issues.
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